

深圳大学公共政策与实验经济学研讨会2022

SZU Public Policy and Experimental Economics Workshop 2022

Organizer: Li King King

腾讯会议: 708-2939-1337

2022/11/26 Sat

2022/11/27 Sun

会议日程

bilibili会议直播

视频号直播

LiKK实验室公众号



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深圳大学大数据经济与金融研究中心

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深圳大学公共政策与实验经济学研讨会 2022

SZU Public Policy and Experimental Economics Workshop 2022

腾讯会议号 (VooV Meeting ID): 708 2939 1337

2022/11/26	Speaker	Title
09:00-09:05	欢迎辞 Welcoming Remarks	
09:05-09:50	陈岩 Yan Chen <i>Discussant:</i> Iris W. Hung	Social Identity and Belief Formation: With Applications to Polarization
09:50-10:35	李景景 King King LI <i>Discussant:</i> Fangwen LU	Childbearing Age and Gender Discrimination in Hiring Decisions: A Large-Scale Field Experiment
10:35-10:50	茶歇 Teabreak	
10:50-11:35	孟涓涓 Juanjuan MENG <i>Discussant:</i> Xianghong WANG	Strategic Thinking and Media Bias Evidence from Chinese Microblog Users
11:35-12:20	李玲芳 Lingfang LI <i>Discussant:</i> Juanjuan MENG	Job Changing Frequency and Experimental Decisions: A Field Study of Migrant Workers in Manufacturing Industry
12:20-13:50	午餐 Lunch	
14:00-14:45	Manshu Khanna <i>Discussant:</i> Lan YAO	Affirmative Action in Two Dimensions: A Multi-Period Apportionment Problem
14:45-15:30	姚澜 Lan YAO <i>Discussant:</i> Manshu Khanna	Two-stage Chinese College Admission
15:30-15:45	茶歇 Teabreak	
15:45-16:30	江明 Ming JIANG <i>Discussant:</i> Osub KWON	Decision Quality Under Time Scarcity: Evidence from a Large Chess Database
16:30-17:15	王湘红 Xianghong WANG <i>Discussant:</i> Yang YANG	Qualifications, Willingness to Lead, and Gender Debiasing in Leader Selection
17:15-18:00	包特 Te BAO <i>Discussant:</i> Peiran JIAO	One-Share-One-Vote and Dual-Class Shares in the Laboratory
18:00-20:00	晚餐 Dinner	

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2022/11/27	Speaker	Title
09:00-09:45	方汉明 Hanming FANG <i>Discussant:</i> Shuo CHEN	Tournament-Style Political Competition and Local Protectionism: Theory and Evidence from China
09:45-10:30	陈硕 Shuo CHEN <i>Discussant:</i> Wei SI	Influence Activities in Academia: Evidence from Social Media
10:30-10:45	茶歇 Teabreak	
10:45-11:30	陆方文 Fangwen LU <i>Discussant:</i> Yvonne Jie CHEN	Growing by Mentoring: Experimental Evidence from College Student Mentors
11:30-12:15	洪伟萍 Iris W. Hung <i>Discussant:</i> Tong WANG	Beauty Implicit Theories Increases Financial Risk-Taking
12:15-13:45	午餐 Lunch	
13:50-14:35	张旭 Xu ZHANG <i>Discussant:</i> Zhixin DAI	Nudge for Sanitation: Experimental Evidence from Rural China
14:35-15:20	权五燮 Osub Kwon <i>Discussant:</i> Xu ZHANG	A Simple Experiment on Simple Bayesian Persuasion
15:20-15:35	茶歇 Teabreak	
15:35-16:20	杨扬 Yang YANG <i>Discussant:</i> Lu DONG	Asymmetric Reciprocity: Theory and Experiment
16:20-17:05	刘烁 Shuo LIU <i>Discussant:</i> Ming JIANG	Happy Times: Identification from Ordered Response Data
17:05-17:50	代志新 Zhixin DAI <i>Discussant:</i> Te BAO	Can behavioral nudging improve tax compliance? Evidence from a randomized field experiment
18:00-20:00	晚餐 Dinner	

会议地点 Venue

广东省深圳市南山区海德三道 1288 号航天科技广场 B 座 7 楼寰图-迪拜会议室
Dubai Conference Room, 7/F, CASC International Center Block B, 3rd Haide Avenue
1288, Nanshan, Shenzhen



题目/Title

Social Identity and Belief Formation: With Applications to Polarization

作者/Authors

Kevin Bauer, Yan Chen, Florian Hett and Michael Kosfeld

内容简介/Abstract

Identifying the determinants of political polarization is a pressing issue across the social sciences. Using an online experiment with nationally-representative participants, deployed the week prior to the 2020 US presidential election, we explore how partisan group identity impacts the process of political opinion formation. Assessing group identity through ingroup favoritism in monetary allocations, we incentivize subjects to predict policy-sensitive statistics one year post-election, conditional on which candidate becomes president. Our results show that people who exhibit ingroup favoritism show a stronger partisan gap in initial predictions, spend more resources to avoid articles from politically-opposing sources, and increase their partisan gap more strongly after reading relevant news articles. Exogenously reducing the salience of group identity decreases partisan bias in information avoidance, especially for ingroup-favoring individuals. In a second wave of experiments deployed in February 2021, participants continue to exhibit ingroup bias in a neutral Bayesian updating task. They value their own signals more than those of other ingroup members, whose signals are valued more than those of outgroup members. Debiasing the misperceived accuracy of information sources reduces overall outgroup information avoidance.

主讲人介绍/Biography of the speaker



Yan Chen is the Daniel Kahneman Collegiate Professor in the School of Information at University of Michigan, and Distinguished Visiting Professor of Economics at Tsinghua University. Her research interests are in behavioral and experimental economics, market and mechanism design. She is a former president of the Economic Science Association, an international organization of experimental economists. Chen has published in leading economics and management journals, such as the *American Economic Review*, *Journal of Political Economy*, *Journal of Economic Theory*, and *Management Science*, and general interest journals such as the *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*. She serves as a Department Editor of *Management Science*.

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题目/Title

Childbearing Age and Gender Discrimination in Hiring Decisions: A Large-Scale Field Experiment

作者/Authors

King King Li, Lunzheng Li, Wei Si, and Zhibo Xu

内容简介/Abstract

We conduct a large-scale field experiment in China to investigate the effect of being of childbearing age on gender discrimination in the labor market. We send 35,713 fictitious resumes to real job postings on a major Chinese online recruitment platform for jobs in four leading cities, Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen, which vary in the length of maternity leave. We send applications for positions advertised in the male-dominated field of information technology (IT), the female-dominated field of accounting (ACC), and the mixed-gender field of human resources (HR). We systematically vary the age and gender of the job applicants and record callbacks for interviews. To accurately mimic the job application process in the Chinese labor market, we do not disclose the applicants' family status. We find that women of childbearing age are subject to discrimination in the field of IT, a problem that also exists in HR and ACC, particularly in Beijing and Shanghai. There is no obvious discrimination against women of childbearing age in Guangzhou or Shenzhen, where maternity leave is longer. In the aggregate, the evidence indicates that women of childbearing age face statistical discrimination that prevents them from obtaining equal employment opportunities.

主讲人介绍/Biography of the speaker



李景景：深圳大学深圳南特金融科技学院、深大微众金融科技学院副教授，香港科技大学经济学博士，研究兴趣为实验经济学、行为经济学和行为金融，最新研究题目包括货币中性、金融科技与投资者行为、借贷行为、和与环境保护、劳动力市场相关的实地实验。他是首位使用实验经济学方法研究语言和决策、记忆偏见和随机偏好的学者。论文发表在 Management Science、Experimental Economics、Journal of Economic Psychology、Social Choice and Welfare、Journal of Risk and Uncertainty、Economic Theory、Human Brain Mapping 等学术期刊。他是期刊 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 的 Associate Editor 和期刊 Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 的编辑委员会成员。

Li King King (PhD in Economics from HKUST) is an Experimental Economist. He is currently an associate professor at Shenzhen Audencia Financial Technology Institute,

WeBank Institute of Financial Technology, Shenzhen University. His research interests are in Experimental Economics, Behavioral Economics, and Behavioral Finance. Li's recent research topics include neutrality of money, investor behavior, and field experiments related to environmental protection and labor market discrimination. He is the first to use Experimental Economics to study the effect of language on decision making (Li, 2017, JEconPsy), memory recall biases (Li, 2013, ExpEcon), and preference for randomization (Li, 2011, JRU). He has published in Management Science, Experimental Economics, Journal of Economic Psychology, Social Choice and Welfare, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Economic Theory, Human Brain Mapping, and others.

He is an Associate Editor of the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, and a member of the Editorial Board of the Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics.

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题目/Title

Strategic Thinking and Media Bias Evidence from Chinese Microblog Users

作者/Authors

Yihong Huang, Juanjuan Meng, Xi Weng

内容简介/Abstract

It has been shown that media bias contributes to belief polarization from the supply side. This paper provides a novel perspective from the demand side by testing whether news consumers are strategic enough to detect media bias. We propose a theoretical framework which shows that the tendency of reposting news with political inclination inconsistent with the media outlet's general ideology is an indicator of strategic thinking. Combining both field data from Chinese Microblog users and an online experiment that exogenously varies whether news sources are revealed, we show both observational and causal evidence that Microblog users are more likely to repost inconsistent news, an indication of general strategic reaction. We also show that simply reminding people of media bias can make their decisions more strategic.

主讲人介绍/Biography of the speaker



Dr. Juanjuan Meng is a professor of Department of Applied Economics at Guanghai School of Management, Peking University. She earned her Ph.D. in Economics from University of California, San Diego. Dr. Meng's current research interests include Behavior Economics, Experimental Economics and Behavior Finance. Her research has been published in *American Economic Review*, *Management Science*, *Review of Economics and Statistics*, *Journal of Public Economics*, *International Economic Review*, *Journal of Development Economics*, *Games and Economic Behavior*, *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, etc. She is now the associate editor of *Management Science*.

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题目/Title

Job Changing Frequency and Experimental Decisions: A Field Study of Migrant Workers in Manufacturing Industry

作者/Authors

Lingfang (Ivy) Li, Yuting Wu, Xun Zhu, Rongwei Chu, Iris Hung

内容简介/Abstract

Migrant workers form a very important part of the labor force in the economic development of China. Their turnover decisions may affect the stability of the performance of the manufacturing industries. It is important to understand what kind of individual behavioral preferences may affect their job changing frequency. This study conducts a lab-in-the-field experiment through a large online-to-offline job-matching platform to elicit migrant workers' preferences, such as uncertainty attitude, inter-temporal choices and emphasis on fairness. The study also surveys their demographic characteristics and other factors related to their job choices. We find that subjects who are more risk seeking change jobs more frequently. We also obtained real employment data from the platform to support one explanation of this result: risk seeking subjects possess more optimistic expectations of potential job opportunities. They are more likely to sample different jobs and thus generate higher job changing frequency. Our findings may help policy-makers and employers design policies or mechanisms to prevent exorbitant job changing behavior.

主讲人介绍/Biography of the speaker



李玲芳，复旦大学管理学院应用经济系，教授，副系主任，博士生导师，中国金融消费者权益保护研究中心-行为经济与金融研究室主任，复旦发展研究院数字经济与产业发展课题组主任，“国家自然科学基金优青”、上海“浦江人才”及“曙光人才”获得者。美国加州大学尔湾分校经济学博士，曾在美国路易威尔大学任助理教授，上海财经大学任经济学院任副教授及市场机制设计及信息经济研究中心主任。其研究主要聚焦与数字经济、行为经济及金融等方面，主要通过运用市场机制设计和实验经济学方法针对网购市场和金融市场上的信息不对称问题开展研究，发表多篇国际顶级匿名评审学术期刊论文，其中包括Management Science及Rand Journal of Economics。曾获得中国数字贸易研究奖、上海市哲学社会科学优秀成果论文奖二等奖等奖项。

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题目/Title

Affirmative Action in Two Dimensions: A Multi-Period Apportionment Problem

作者/Authors

Haydar Evren, Manshu Khanna

内容简介/Abstract

In many settings affirmative action policies apply at two levels simultaneously, for instance, at university as well as at its departments. We show that commonly used methods in reserving positions for beneficiaries of affirmative action are often inadequate in such settings. We present a comprehensive evaluation of existing procedures to formally document their shortcomings. We propose a new solution with appealing theoretical properties and quantify the benefits of adopting it using recruitment advertisement data from India.

主讲人介绍/Biography of the speaker



Manshu is an Assistant Professor at Peking University HSBC Business School. He works on problems related to markets, mechanisms, and society. His latest research informs design of matching mechanisms, bargaining protocols and affirmative action schemes.

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题目/Title

Two-stage Chinese College Admission


作者/Authors

Xinquan Hu, Lan Yao, Jun Zhang

内容简介/Abstract

The college admission system of China has used a two-stage procedure to match high school seniors with colleges for decades. The first stage sends students' applications to colleges, with each student being sent to at most one college. The second stage assigns each college's applicants to its majors. It is remarkable that students who are rejected in the second stage cannot send applications to the other colleges in their rank-order lists, which incentivizes students to accept major transfer options to increase the chance of being matched. We study the current form of the two-stage procedure called Chinese Parallel Mechanism (CPM) and demonstrate its flaws. We propose an improvement called Rectified Parallel Mechanism (RPM) by combining the two stages of CPM into one stage. We extend our analyses to an ongoing reform in China and compare a new mechanism (IPM) that allows students to freely rank majors in different colleges with CPM and RPM. We conduct lab experiments to test our theory and quantify the differences between the three mechanisms. Experimental data show that the major transfer acceptance rate under RPM (63%) is significantly lower than that under CPM (97%). The three mechanisms are close in efficiency, but IPM outperforms the others in fairness and RPM lies in between.

主讲人介绍/Biography of the speaker



姚澜，巴塞罗那自治大学经济学博士，上海财经大学经济学院教授，博士生导师。主要研究领域为行为经济学、实验经济学、应用微观经济学。研究方向主要集中在个人风险与不确定性下的决策、行为博弈中的亲社会行为和机制设计。近年来在 *Quarterly Journal of Economics*、*Quantitative Economics*、*European Economic Review*、《经济研究》等期刊发表多篇论文。曾获得教育部第八届高等学校科学研究优秀成果二等奖，主持国家自然科学基金面上项目、国家自然科学基金青年项目、教育部人文社会科学基金等。担任 *Management Science*、*Economic Journal* 等国际期刊审稿人。

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题目/Title

Decision Quality Under Time Scarcity: Evidence from a Large Chess Database

作者/Authors

Ming Jiang, Jingchao Li

内容简介/Abstract

Time scarcity has been shown to affect judgment and decision-making quality in the literature. The behavioral economics literature studying this problem however mostly relies on laboratory experiments, which are lacking in scale and real-world relevance. Using the online chess server lichess.org's open database, we analyze millions of rated chess games with Rapid (10-minute) and Blitz (5-minute) time control with each move time-stamped. Using chess engine to evaluate each move's quality, we find that the probability of blundering increases as the available time decreases. Players with higher Elo rating and titled masters, while generally make less mistakes, are not immune to the effect of time pressure. Further, using a predetermined audio-visual alarm on the platform that goes off when the time is running low as the threshold for regression discontinuity design, we find that simply making time shortage salient will reduce decision quality.

主讲人介绍/Biography of the speaker



江明，现任上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院经济系副教授。于美国密西根大学信息学院获得博士学位。他的研究方向为利用实证研究、实验室实验和实地实验的方法，来探索行为经济学、发展经济学、匹配与市场设计等相关领域的问题。他的研究发表于 PNAS, Management Science, Games and Economic Behavior, Experimental Economics 等国际知名期刊。

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题目/Title

Qualifications, Willingness to Lead, and Gender Debiasing in Leader Selection

作者/Authors

Yutong Li, Xianghong Wang, Jie Zheng

内容简介/Abstract

This study examines how leader selection is affected by individual qualifications and willingness to lead using laboratory experiments. The experimental treatments are whether the candidate's information involves the willingness to lead (WTL), and whether the group leader's task emphasizes ability or leader's group responsibility. The votes for women increase when the selection does not involve willingness to lead. In the ability setting, WTL is higher for men than for women; leaders of both genders perform equally well. In the responsibility setting, the level of WTL is similar for men and women; male leaders' performance is invariant to the information treatment, while female leaders with elicited WTL perform better than their counterparts with no such elicitation.

主讲人介绍/Biography of the speaker



王湘红，中国人民大学经济学院教授。经济行为与组织实验室主任，*Economic and Political Studies*（《经济与政治研究》）期刊副主编。在美国卡耐基梅隆大学获公共政策与管理博士学位。主要研究兴趣包括行为和实验经济学，公共政策，收入分配，女性发展政策，消费行为。研究成果曾发表在 *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, *Journal of Economic Psychology*, *Journal of Comparative Economics*, *Journal of Development Studies*, 《世界经济》，《金融研究》等学术刊物上，并多次获得优秀论文奖。主持过多项国家自然科学基金项目。世界经济论坛（World Economic Forum）全球程序理事会第一届行为分会委员；世界经济论坛全球未来理事会新经济分会委员；中国行为与实验经济学论坛（China BEEF）秘书长。

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题目/Title

One-Share-One-Vote and Dual-Class Shares in the Laboratory

作者/Authors

Te Bao, Edward Halim, Yohanes Eko Riyanto

内容简介/Abstract

We test the seminal Grossman and Hart (1988) model on the optimality of the one-share-one-vote share structure against the dual-class share structure in a laboratory experiment. Our result shows qualitative support to their theoretical prediction asserting that the more efficient contender of control (incumbent or raider) is more likely to win the takeover contest under one-share-one-vote than under dual-class shares. It is interesting to note that contenders generally submit tender-offer prices higher than their maximum willingness to pay predicted by theory in all our treatments. However, the price deviation from the fundamental value is smaller under one-share-one-vote than under dual-class shares. Overall, our results show supportive evidence for better allocation and information efficiency of one-share-one-vote and draw attention to some practical issues when the theory is applied to real market settings.

主讲人介绍/Biography of the speaker



Te Bao is an Associate Professor of Economics at the School of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University Singapore. His main research interests are experimental economics, behavioral finance, and computational economics. He published more than 20 papers in journals like Economic Journal, European Economic Review, Experimental Economics, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization and Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. He is currently an Associate Editor of Singapore Economic Review and served as a Member of Advisory Council of the Society for Computational Economics from 2018 to 2021.

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题目/Title

Tournament-Style Political Competition and Local Protectionism: Theory and Evidence from China

作者/Authors

Hanming Fang, Ming Li, Zenan Wu

内容简介/Abstract

We argue that inter-jurisdictional competition in a regionally decentralized authoritarian regime distorts local politicians' incentives in resource allocation among firms from their own city and a competing city. We develop a tournament model of project selection that captures the driving forces of local protectionism. The model robustly predicts that the joint presence of regional spillover and the incentive for political competition leads to biased resource allocations against the competing regions. Combining several unique data sets, we test our model predictions in the context of government procurement allocation and firms' equity investment across Chinese cities. We find that, first, when local politicians are in more intensive political competition, they allocate less government procurement contracts to firms in the competing city; second, local firms, especially local SOEs, internalize the local politicians' career concerns and invest less in the competing cities. Our paper provides a political economy explanation for inefficient local protectionism in an autocracy incentivized by tournament-style political competition.

主讲人介绍/Biography of the speaker



方汉明, 现任宾夕法尼亚大学经济学讲席教授, 经济系系主任, 国际计量经济学会会士。主要研究领域为公共经济学, 劳动力经济学和中国经济。他曾担任上海科技大学创业与管理学院(海外)院长以及美国国家经济研究局中国经济研究组组长。他是应用微观经济学领域的学术带头人之一; 曾担任《公共经济学期刊》和《国际经济评论》共同主编, 和多家其他期刊, 包括顶尖经济学期刊《美国经济评论》的编委, 现在担任《风险和保险期刊》高级主编。他研究兴趣广泛, 研究方法上擅长将理论和实证紧密结合。他的具体研究课题包括歧视经济学的理论和实证方法, 社会保障体制包括医疗保险市场的理论和实证的研究, 人寿保险市场和老龄化等。他在医疗保险市场方面的研究获得了国际卫生经济学会颁发的最佳健康经济学肯尼斯·阿罗大奖(2010)。

Hanming Fang is Class of 1965 Term Chair Professor of Economics at the University of Pennsylvania and the Chair of the Department of Economics at Penn. He is a Fellow

of Econometric Society. His main research areas are public economics, labor economics and the Chinese economy. He served as the Dean of the School of Entrepreneurship and Management at ShanghaiTech University and the Director of the Chinese Economy Working Group for the National Bureau of Economic Research (USA). He is a leader in applied microeconomics. He was a co-editor for *Journal of Public Economics* and *International Economic Review* and served on the editorial board for several other journals, including the top economics journal, *American Economic Review*. He is now a Senior Editor of *Journal of Risk and Insurance*. He has a wide range of research interests, and his research tends to combine theory with evidence. His research topics range from the theoretical and empirical methods of economics of discrimination, health insurance market, life insurance market and population aging. His research on health insurance market received the Kenneth Arrow Award for the best health economics research from the International Health Economics Association in 2010.

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题目/Title

Influence Activities in Academia: Evidence from Social Media

作者/Authors

Shuo Chen ,Xinyu Fan, Albert Roh

内容简介/Abstract

Individuals exploit influence activities for personal gains. This paper shows that tenure-track assistant professors click more “likes” under the dean's social media posts than their tenured colleagues during performance evaluation periods, utilizing a natural experiment in a university where the dean has substantial personnel discretions. The effect is greater for faculties with less-competitive publication records, and for more frequent social media users prior to the evaluation periods. The results remain robust after considering content heterogeneity, social ties, sample bias, career prospects, and individual-level changes. The findings thus highlight the strategic use of influence activities through social media for career advancements.

主讲人介绍/Biography of the speaker



陈硕，复旦大学经济系教授，博士毕业于香港科技大学社会科学部。研究兴趣为发展经济学、政治经济学及经济史。陈硕教授中文成果发表在《经济研究》、《管理世界》、《金融研究》、《经济学季刊》等期刊上，英文成果发表在 American Economic Review、American Political Science Review、American Economic Journal、Journal of Economic Growth、Journal of Development Economics、Journal of Corporate Finance、Journal of International Business Studies 等期刊上。目前主持国家自然科学基金青年、面上及重点项目，以及省部级课题及重大课题。

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题目/Title

Growing by Mentoring: Experimental Evidence from College Student Mentors

作者/Authors

Fangwen Lu, Haiyan Zhang, and Yean Zhou

内容简介/Abstract

We organized a voluntary online mentoring program that randomly assigned college students as mentors and randomly paired mentors with middle school student mentees. A comprehensive evaluation shows that a one-semester mentoring service significantly improves mentors' ability in providing support, raises their appreciation of government's anti-poverty efforts, induces more egalitarianism in redistribution, increases their compromise between equality and efficiency, and generates familiarity preference. Specific personal experience matters. Mentors who observed different links between mentees' academic performance, effort, and family background viewed fairness differently, and their preference for equality and efficiency depended on whether mentees made good use of the mentoring program.

主讲人介绍/Biography of the speaker



陆方文，美国加州伯克利大学博士毕业，现任中国人民大学经济学院教授，教育部青年长江学者和国家自然科学基金优秀青年项目获得者。她擅长运用随机实验方法，其研究成果发表在经济学、管理学和医学的顶尖学术期刊，其中包括 *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, *British Medical Journal*, *Journal of Development Economics*, *Journal of Labor Economics*, *Journal of Public Economics*, *Management Science*, 《经济研究》等，并出版专著《随机实地实验：理论、方法和在中国的运用》。曾荣获第五届“教育部全国教育科学研究优秀成果奖”，以及第十四届和第十六届“北京市哲学社会科学优秀成果奖”。

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题目/Title

Beauty Implicit Theories Increases Financial Risk-Taking

作者/Authors

Natalie T. Faust and Iris W. Hung

内容简介/Abstract

In the current research, we studied how beauty, an important human attribute, influences consumer decision making and behavior. We found that beauty implicit theories can (a) produce strong cross-domain impact on financial risk-taking behavior, and (b) elevate a sense of optimism, which do not necessarily occur for other implicit theories. Using both hypothetical choices (Studies 1, 3, and 4) and real behavior (Studies 2 and 6) in one cross-country survey and five experiments, we found that (1) incremental theorists, who believed that beauty is malleable and improvable, took greater financial risks than entity theorists, who believed that beauty is fixed, and (2) an incremental belief of beauty heightens a general sense of optimism, which consequently promotes risk-seeking behavior in financial decision making.

主讲人介绍/Biography of the speaker



Prof. Iris W. Hung is Presidential Fellow and Professor of Marketing. Iris obtained her PhD from the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology in 2008. She got tenure from the National University of Singapore in 2014 and has been a professor at Fudan University. She also has visiting appointments at the Sloan School of Management at MIT and Duke Kunshan University. Her research focuses on consumer decision making and prosocial behavior. Her research has been featured by media and government organizations such as the Financial Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Bloomberg Business Week, the Psychology Today, and the United States Department of Health

and Human Services. She serves on the editorial review board as a co-editor at the International Journal of Research in Marketing (2018-2021), associate editor at the Journal of Consumer Psychology and the International Journal of Research in Marketing, and a reviewer at the Journal of Marketing and the Journal of Consumer Research (2014-2020).

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题目/Title

Nudge for Sanitation: Experimental Evidence from Rural China

作者/Authors

Yanlin WAN and Xu ZHANG

内容简介/Abstract

This study explores the effects of informational nudges on villagers' understanding of China's nationwide sanitation campaign, Rural Toilet Revolution (RTR), and their willingness to participate. We conducted a randomized controlled trial (RCT) in a rural region located in southwestern China. Based on the local dwellers' information demand for RTR programs and the concept of messenger effects, we designed six RTR advocacy videos as informational nudges, highlighting respectively benefits of RTR participation, harms of poor sanitation, and techniques for toilet upgrade, with and without a former RTR participant calling for engagement. We found that explaining the required techniques with the presence of a peer villager improved villagers' comprehension of RTR and self-reported willingness to participate most significantly. Our results indicate the importance of technical attributes associated with RTR for the target audience and underline the effectiveness of information barrier removal and peer messenger presence in promoting public campaigns like RTR.

主讲人介绍/Biography of the speaker



张旭助理教授 2020 年 5 月获布朗大学经济学博士，现任职于香港科技大学（广州）创新创业与公共政策学域。其研究领域包括微观经济学理论、信息经济学、行为经济学与实验经济学。研究主题涵盖信息设计、非理性概率推断、信任与合作以及社会偏好等问题。主要研究成果发表于 *Journal of Political Economy*、*Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* 等知名经济学国际期刊。

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题目/Title

A Simple Experiment on Simple Bayesian Persuasion

作者/Authors

Pak Hung Au, Osub Kwon, King King Li

内容简介/Abstract

This experiment tests Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) in a simple setting. We adopt an experimental design where the Sender chooses a partition of the state space instead of an information structure. We find that 1) the Senders' strategies generally satisfy the optimal property that the weaker signal is fully revealing, but 2) their strategies are persistently suboptimal in the sense that the stronger signal is systematically set weaker than what the Receivers require to take the Senders' preferred action, resulting in persistently high rate of persuasion failure. However, 3) once we replace the Receivers with a robot who plays a known strategy, most Senders quickly learn to play the optimal strategy. This suggests that the key strategic element of Bayesian Persuasion is easy to understand for the Senders, although guessing what posterior probability a human Receiver would require to take the preferred action is a more difficult problem.

主讲人介绍/Biography of the speaker



权五燮，南开大学金融学院助理教授。研究方向为信息经济学，微观经济学理论，和行为与实验经济学。

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题目/Title

Asymmetric Reciprocity: Theory and Experiment

作者/Authors

Yunwen He, Jaimie Lien, Yang Yang, Jie Zheng

内容简介/Abstract

When helping or reciprocating towards others, people take not only efficient actions, but also inefficient ones - with the underlying costs exceeding the benefit to opponents. This may be unreasonable if one cares about showing kindness while knowing that only the consequences (but not the costs) associated with one's actions are considered in evaluating kindness. In this paper, we extend Falk and Fischbacher's (2006) theory of reciprocity by incorporating both the costs and the consequences of an action in the evaluation of one's kindness. We further conduct a laboratory experiment to test the model. Using a series of asymmetric gift-exchange games in the laboratory, in which we vary senders' and receivers' ability to benefit their partners at one unit of their own cost, we estimate the model and find the following results: (i) In the initial interaction, the paid cost and the induced consequence are considered equally important in evaluating the kindness; (ii) when reciprocating others' kindness, the costs paid are considered more important than the actual consequence; (iii) As a comparison to the situation that the reciprocating opportunity arises as a surprise, receivers pay more to reciprocate towards the sender.

主讲人介绍/Biography of the speaker



杨扬, 中山大学岭南学院经济学副教授, 博士生导师, 阿姆斯特丹大学经济学博士。她的研究集中于行为和实验经济学、应用博弈论。她在研究中使用博弈理论分析和实验方法, 探讨不同环境下信息机制对决策主体间策略性互动的影响, 以及文化、语言等因素对个体决策的影响。其多篇学术成果发表于 *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, *Journal of Economic Psychology*, 《管理科学学报》、《系统工程理论与实践》等学术期刊, 主持和参与了多项国家自然科学基金和广东省自然科学基金项目。

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题目/Title

Happy Times: Identification from Ordered Response Data

作者/Authors

Shuo Liu, Nick Netzer

内容简介/Abstract

Surveys that measure subjective states like happiness or preferences often generate ordinal data. Ordered response models, which are commonly used to analyze such data, suffer from a fundamental identification problem. Their conclusions depend entirely on unjustified assumptions about the distribution of a latent variable. In this paper, we propose using survey response times to solve that problem. Response times contain information about the distribution of the latent variable, even among subjects who give the same ordinal survey response. We provide conditions under which group differences in, for example, happiness are identified. We apply our method to an online survey and obtain evidence that happiness follows distributions for which traditional assumptions are valid. The evidence is more mixed for our preference questions, and traditional assumptions are not confirmed for our question about political attitudes.

主讲人介绍/Biography of the speaker



刘烁，北京大学光华管理学院应用经济学系助理教授。2019年毕业于瑞士苏黎世大学经济系，获经济学博士学位。目前主要研究领域为产业与组织经济学，博弈论，以及机制设计理论。研究成果发表或即将发表于国内外知名学术期刊，如 *Theoretical Economics*, *Journal of Economic Theory*, *Economic Journal*, *RAND Journal of Economics*, *Games and Economic Behavior*, *European Economic Review*, *Economic Theory*,

《经济学》（季刊）等。

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题目/Title

Can behavioral nudging improve tax compliance? Evidence from a randomized field experiment

作者/Authors

Zhixin Dai, Hongyu Gao and Peng Cheng

内容简介/Abstract

Tax compliance is an important part of tax governance. With the increasing application of behavioral nudging in the field of tax compliance, many literatures have begun to study the role of behavioral nudging in promoting tax compliance, but so far, there is no consensus on which type of behavioral nudging is most effective. In this paper, a randomized field experiment was designed to investigate the influence of behavioral nudging on individual income tax compliance for equity transfer income, and to compare the effectiveness of three nudging methods: information nudge, tax morale related nudge and deterrence nudge. The experimental evidences show that behavioral nudging can significantly improve taxpayers' tax compliance and double the tax declaration rate, but there is no significant difference in the impact of different types of behavioral nudging, and the addition of moral information and deterrent information on the basis of baseline reminder information does not have additional positive effect. Based on the heterogeneity analysis of grouped regression and causal forest, it was found that moral nudging produced the most negative effects and even backfired on some taxpayers, and different types of behavioral nudging had heterogeneous effects among taxpayers with different observable characteristics. Cost-benefit analysis shows that behavioral nudging can effectively increase the government's tax revenue, and behavioral nudging is a highly cost-effective intervention. The findings of this paper are of high reference value for China's tax collection and administration system reform, and can provide practical guidance for improving tax compliance and reducing the cost of tax collection.

主讲人介绍/Biography of the speaker



代志新，中国人民大学财政金融学院副教授，博士生导师，首批中国人民大学杰出青年学者，兼任中国人民大学实教处副处长，中国人民大学财税研究所副所长，中国人民大学体育产业研究院副院长，中国人民大学法国与法语国家研究院副院长，中国人民大学国家发展与战略研究院内参部主任，南阳分院副院长，中国人民大学交叉学科研究院对外合作委员会主任，中国税收学会中青年研究会理事，中国行为实验经济论坛常务秘书长，中国欧洲学会法国研究分会理事，国家认监委首届专家组成员，中国市政工程协会科学技术委员会首届专家组成员，曾挂职北京市地税局稽查处副处长，教育部学科、学位评估专家，国家留学基金委评审专家，自然科学基金委评审专家。

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